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51 years on from the Flixborough disaster – What happened and what have we learnt?

51 years on from the Flixborough disaster – What happened and what have we learnt?

Posted

02.06.2025

Written by

Nick Freer Tristan Pulford

What happened?

The Flixborough plant produced caprolactam, a precursor to nylon. One of the key steps in the process involved the oxidation of cyclohexane in a high-temperature, high-pressure environment using six large reactors connected in series.

In March 1974, a crack was discovered in the shell of reactor No. 5. Rather than shutting down operations entirely or replacing the reactor, management opted to bypass it with a temporary flexible pipe, a modification made without proper engineering assessment.

The bypass involved installing an 20-inch diameter dog-leg-shaped pipe between reactors 4 and 6. This design was put together hastily and lacked proper mechanical support or stress analysis. It was fabricated onsite by plant personnel without detailed design drawings or the input of a qualified mechanical engineer.

On June 1, 1974, the temporary pipe failed. An estimated 40 to 60 tons of cyclohexane were released in a matter of seconds. The flammable vapour formed a large cloud which quickly found an ignition source, leading to a massive explosion equivalent to 15 tons of TNT. The blast flattened much of the plant and destroyed homes and buildings in the surrounding area

Flixborough Disaster – CH506-Environmental Pollution Control and Safety Management.

Figure 1: Diagram showing why the Flixborough disaster occurred. Reference: Flixborough Disaster – CH506-Environmental Pollution Control and Safety Management

Why did it happen?

The Flixborough disaster occurred due to a combination of technical failures, inadequate safety measures and systemic management neglect. The failures are highlighted below:

- Unqualified Design Changes
- The bypass pipe was designed and installed without proper mechanical engineering input.
- No formal design or stress analysis was conducted.
- Inadequate Management of Change (MoC)
-There was no systematic MoC process to evaluate the implications of bypassing a critical reactor.
- Poor Documentation and Communication
- Design decisions were made informally with minimal documentation.
- Senior management was unaware of the risks introduced by the temporary piping.
- Lack of Safety Culture
- Safety concerns took a backseat to production goals.
- The workforce had limited training on recognising or communicating hazards.

Figure 2: Flixborough Cyclohexane plant after the disaster. Reference: Flixborough 50 Years On: Lessons for Managers and Engineers Today – Features – The Chemical Engineer

 

What can we learn 51 years on?

The 51st anniversary of the Flixborough disaster serves as a reminder of the catastrophic consequences which can occur if neglecting process safety in chemical operations. The lessons learned emphasise not only operational and cultural improvements but also specific physical measures that can prevent similar disasters. Here are key elements for companies to implement at their sites:

Robust Management of Change Process

  • Lesson Learned: A major process change—bypassing a reactor—was made without proper design review, risk assessment, or documentation.
  • Key Actions:
    • All modifications, even temporary ones, must go through a formal MoC process that includes technical evaluations, hazard analysis, and approval by qualified personnel.

Engineering Design Must Be Competent and Documented

  • Lesson Learned: The bypass pipe was designed by non-specialist staff without mechanical stress analysis or sufficient drawings.
  • Key Actions:
    • Design of process equipment must be carried out or approved by qualified engineers using sound engineering practices. Temporary solutions must be treated with the same rigor as permanent ones.

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Are Critical

  • Lesson Learned: The risk of a catastrophic failure from pipe rupture and cyclohexane release was not identified.
  • Key Actions:
    • Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPs) and other risk assessments must be conducted for process changes, even if they seem minor.

Mechanical Integrity and Support Systems Matter

  • Lesson Learned: The bypass pipe lacked proper support and was vulnerable to vibration and pressure stress.
  • Key Actions:
    • Mechanical integrity programs must ensure that all piping systems are properly designed, supported, and maintained—especially under high temperature and pressure.

Pressure testing of key pressure equipment

  • Lesson Learned: No pressure testing was carried out on the bypass pipework during commissioning.
  • Key Actions:
    • Ensure any key pressure equipment is leak and pressure tested during commissioning to ensure no leaks are identified and conforms to the design pressures required. If a relevant fluid is used under certain pressures, then this should be tested under a written scheme of examination as part of the Pressure Systems Safety Regulations (PSSR).

A Strong Process Safety Culture Is Essential

  • Lesson Learned: Production pressures appeared to outweigh safety concerns, and staff did not have the tools or authority to halt unsafe changes.
  • Key Actions:
    • Organisations must promote a safety-first culture where concerns can be raised, and safety is prioritised over production targets.

Documentation and Communication Must Be Clear

  • Lesson Learned: Poor documentation and lack of communication contributed to misunderstanding the hazards.
  • Key Actions:
    • All changes, designs, inspections, and decisions must be clearly documented and communicated across departments and to all affected personnel.

Emergency Preparedness and Siting

  • Lesson Learned: The explosion killed 28 people, many of whom (18 people) were inside the plant’s central control room which was poorly located and where the windows shattered and the roof collapsed.
  • Key Actions:
    • Emergency response planning, facility siting, and blast-resistant control rooms are crucial design elements to protect personnel.

Learn from Near Misses

  • Lesson Learned: A cracked reactor was an early warning of system weakness, but the response was inadequate.
  • Key Actions:
    • Near misses and equipment failures should trigger full investigations and reviews to prevent escalation into major incidents.

Regulatory Oversight and Standards

  • Lesson Learned: Improper regulations and standards meant certain hazards went unchecked. The disaster prompted major changes in UK regulations and inspired global reforms.
  • Key Actions:
    • Effective regulation, such as Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations is essential for ensuring companies systematically manage hazardous materials and processes.

 

Conclusion

The Flixborough disaster was a tragic but pivotal event in the evolution of process safety. It serves as a sobering reminder that even small changes—if not carefully analysed and managed—can lead to catastrophic outcomes. For professionals in chemical and process industries, the legacy of Flixborough reinforces the need for vigilance, discipline, and a robust safety culture in every operational decision. Finch can support companies with their Process Safety needs whether in Hazard studies or management of change processes.

At Finch we have experience in not only assisting companies with Process Safety elements such as HAZOPs and DSEAR assessments, but also with accident investigation, and expert witness work following gas leaks/ explosions.

Tristan Pulford | Sohail Khan | Nick Freer

We can run HAZOP workshops and DSEAR assessments at your workplace and assist in identifying where there are gaps and support you with finalising solutions and closing the gaps.

Tristan is a chartered mechanical engineer and process safety engineer and is Finch Consulting’s Capability Director. Sohail is a chemical engineer experienced in process safety management. Nick Freer is chartered chemical engineer experienced in Process Safety and Asset management.

Finch is a leading risk management consultancy, working worldwide with blue-chip clients in multiple sectors.

As a “critical partner” to our clients, we provide confidence to be a better business by helping identify, manage and mitigate risks associated with engineering, health and safety, and regulatory compliance. This is delivered through three core areas: Asset Management, Health & Safety Management and Process Safety Management.

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